Is Washington Manufacturing the Strategic Autonomy of Its Allies
For years, American security in Asia was simple: the United States protected its allies, who depended on Washington for their security. Japan and South Korea illustrate this model well. Taiwan, on the other hand, is in a different situation because it does not have a real defense treaty with the United States. But today, something is changing. Washington is asking its allies and partners to increase their defense spending and to protect themselves better. In theory, this sounds logical? Why should the United States pay the bulk of the defense costs for wealthy countries like Japan or South Korea? But this logic reveals a paradox: the more Washington pushes its partners to rely less on it, the more it encourages them to learn to defend themselves.
South Korea: What If Washington Hesitated?
The South Korean case is particularly interesting. Seoul wants to strengthen its military capabilities and have more control over its forces in the event of conflict. This comes as Washington seeks to reduce some joint military exercises with South Korea. This absolutely does not mean that Seoul wants to abandon its alliance with the United States. The issue is much simpler. South Korea must ask itself: what would it do if, one day, Washington hesitated to intervene? Facing it is a nuclear North Korea, equipped with missiles and now much closer to Russia. Seoul therefore cannot base all its security on a single certainty: that the United States will always be there. This is how strategic autonomy begins. It is not about no longer believing in one’s ally, but rather about thinking it is better to have a backup plan.
Japan: Insurance Within Insurance
Japan is following a slightly different path. For several years, Tokyo has been increasing its military spending. The country is developing longer-range missiles, strengthening its defense industry, and creating new partnerships with Australia, India, the Philippines, and some European countries. Why? Because its environment has become much more worrying. China is strengthening rapidly. North Korea is developing its missiles. The war in Ukraine has also shown that a conflict once considered unlikely can eventually occur. Japan remains deeply attached to its alliance with Washington. But Japan is gradually seeking to acquire a kind of double insurance: continuing to benefit from American protection while also being able to act alone if necessary.
Taiwan: An Even More Fragile Situation
Taiwan is a different case. Unlike South Korea and Japan, there is no pact guaranteeing automatic US military intervention if China attacks the island. Washington supports Taiwan and provides it with weapons. However, no one really knows how and when the United States might intervene during a crisis. For Taipei, the question is therefore even more explicit: if China acts tomorrow, how long could it hold out alone? This is probably why Taiwan is increasing its military investments, improving its drones, and preparing for potential blockade scenarios by training its population and strengthening its infrastructure. Taipei’s goal is obviously not to become as powerful as Beijing. That would be impossible. The goal is simpler: to make any Chinese operation long, difficult, and costly enough to allow outside help to arrive in time. Taiwan is therefore not seeking to replace the United States, but to hold out if the Americans do not arrive immediately.
Three Different Situations, But the Same Direction
Thus, these three countries are each following their own path. South Korea wonders what it would do if Washington hesitated. Japan wants to be better prepared for an increasingly dangerous regional environment. Taiwan wants to resist long enough because it has no automatic US guarantee. But in the end, all three share the same objective: to ensure their own security better.
Is This Necessarily Bad for Washington?
Probably not. A stronger Japan, a better-equipped South Korea, and a Taiwan capable of greater resistance seriously complicate China’s and North Korea’s calculations. This is, after all, what Washington has long demanded: that its partners take more responsibility for their own defense. But there is a consequence. A more autonomous partner also becomes freer. You cannot ask a country to depend less on you while hoping it will always wait for your green light before acting. This may be where the real American paradox lies. For a long time, the strength of the United States in Asia partly rested on its allies’ dependence. In the future, this strength could rest on something else: countries strong enough to defend themselves, but that still choose to remain alongside Washington. This would not necessarily weaken the United States. It may represent a shift from dependence to shared responsibility. Ultimately, true American success could have a paradoxical character: ensuring that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan gradually become less dependent on the United States while still choosing to remain close to Washington.
