Can China Become a Security Power in the M.E. Without Falling Into the USA Trap
For a long time, China’s strategy in the Middle East was quite simple: trade with everyone, buy oil, invest in ports and infrastructure, respect the independence of states, but avoid as much as possible shouldering the burden of regional security.
In some sense, the United States protected the maritime routes. China used them.But this situation is becoming harder to maintain today.The war between the United States and Iran, tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, and the persistent instability in the Red Sea are gradually changing the equation.During his visit to Egypt, Xi Jinping mentioned the possibility of considering a new security arrangement for the Middle East. Even more interestingly, he said that China was ready to work with countries in the region to better protect major international maritime routes.
Of course, caution is still needed. Beijing is not announcing that it intends to replace the U.S. Navy in the Gulf tomorrow. But something is changing in Chinese discourse.And behind this change lies a real dilemma.China now depends far too much on the Middle East to stay completely out of its own security.A large part of its energy passes through very sensitive zones: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal.
At the same time, Chinese investments have multiplied in ports, infrastructure, industrial zones, and transportation networks throughout the region.Egypt is probably one of the best examples of this evolution.For Beijing, Egypt is not only a market of over 100 million inhabitants. It is also the country that controls the Suez Canal, one of the world’s most important trade passages. It sits at the crossroads of the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe. So, it naturally becomes important for China’s new trade routes.
From there, a question arises almost naturally: when a country has so many economic interests in the world, can it continue to let other countries protect the routes it depends on?Probably not. And China has already started, very slowly, to answer this question
.Since 2008, the Chinese navy has participated in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. For several years, Chinese ships have accompanied commercial vessels, and the Chinese navy is thus gaining more and more experience far from its own shores. So, China is not entirely new in the field of maritime security in the Middle East.What could change today is the scale of its commitment. This is precisely where(what i call) the ”Chinese paradox” begins.
For several decades, Beijing has closely observed the American experience in the Middle East.And the lesson it seems to have learned is quite simple: it is much easier to enter this region militarily than to exit.The United States arrived with considerable military power, bases, alliances, and the will to guarantee regional order.But this presence also brought long wars, colossal expenses, permanent political responsibilities, and sometimes lasting hostility toward Washington.
Until now, China has tried to take a very different path. It can talk to Saudi Arabia while maintaining an important relationship with Iran, can develop economic relations with Israel while politically supporting the Palestinian cause,can work with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Oman without asking them to choose between Beijing and Washington.This is probably one of the key points of what could be called Chinese strategic discipline.
China seeks to increase its influence without this automatically implying military responsibility.But the Strait of Hormuz could make this strategy increasingly difficult.When Chinese tankers circulate normally, it is easy to stay cautious and neutral. If these same tankers risk being blocked, attacked, or forced to travel under military escort, the situation changes completely.Neutrality then becomes much harder to maintain.China could therefore be gradually pushed to assume a role it did not necessarily want at first. The growth in military cooperation with Egypt also shows that the relationship between Beijing and Cairo is no longer limited to trade.But China will then have to solve a much more complex problem.
How to protect a Chinese tanker in the Gulf without taking a stand against whoever is threatening that tanker?How to defend freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz while maintaining a strategic relationship with Iran?How to strengthen military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or the Emirates while remaining an acceptable partner for Tehran?Building a port or signing an oil contract is relatively simple, but security is much less so.
China could therefore seek a third way: gradually becoming a security power without becoming the new policeman of the Middle East.This strategy would actually fit its way of operating quite well.Instead of building a network of military alliances like the United States, Beijing might prefer limited naval escorts, joint operations with several countries, cooperation with neighboring countries, occasional military exercises, fighting piracy, protecting infrastructure, and diplomatic mediation. In other words: protecting trade rather than governments.This difference seems essential to me.The United States has long sought to guarantee a certain regional order.China could have a more modest ambition: mainly to ensure that this order works when it directly affects its own interests.This is much less ambitious.But perhaps also much easier to maintain. this strategy, Egypt could take on particular importance.Its position near the Suez Canal, its historic ties with Washington, its rapprochement with Beijing, and its willingness to maintain a balance between the great powers make it a particularly interesting partner for China. So it is precisely this non-exclusive approach that may allow China’s presence to grow without immediately provoking a division into blocs.
one question remains.What will happen when Chinese interests are directly threatened ? To truly protect its trade routes, it must at some point be ready to use force.And when it uses force, it gradually ceases to be external to the conflict. Perhaps that is where the real limit of the Chinese model lies. China probably does not want to inherit the American Middle East. That is the real challenge.Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt does not mean that China is becoming the new policeman of the Middle East ,it shows something much more subtle.Beijing may just be starting to accept a reality: when a great power depends on trade routes thousands of kilometers from home, it cannot always separate its economic interests from their strategic protection.
China mainly needed the routes to remain open.Tomorrow, it may have to help keep them open itself.And it is precisely at that moment that its real test will begin.The Chinese challenge will probably not be to replace the United States in the Middle East. it will be much harder: to become powerful enough to protect its interests, without becoming so involved that it ends up entangled in the region’s conflicts.That may now be the real Chinese strategic discipline.
