Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was one of the major and consequential events of the twenty-first century in the Middle East. The attack, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 people in Israel and the abduction of 251 people, not only changed the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also affected the political and security equations of the entire region. Israel’s military response in Gaza also inflicted significant damage on Hamas and substantially weakened the organization’s military capabilities and leadership.
However, behind this event lies an important strategic question: Was the October 7 attack solely a military decision by Hamas, or was it part of a broader regional confrontation in which Iran and its allied armed groups played an important role?
To understand the depth of this event, three issues need to be distinguished: Hamas’s decision to carry out the attack; Iran’s role in supporting Hamas and its allied armed groups; and the consequences of the event for the future of Palestine and the balance of power in the Middle East.
1. October 7: A Military Decision and Its Consequences
Hamas carried out the October 7 attack in a planned manner. The question is whether Hamas’s leadership had fully anticipated the scale of Israel’s military response and its long-term consequences for Gaza.
A decision to launch an attack of this kind, in any political or military context, requires a careful assessment of one’s own capabilities, the opponent’s capabilities, the level of external support, and the likelihood of a response from the other side. Yet the consequences following the attack have raised a fundamental question: Did the strategy adopted by Hamas truly serve the national and political objectives of the Palestinian people, or did it inflict enormous damage on the Palestinian cause at both the domestic and international levels?
The consequences of the war—including widespread destruction in Gaza, the deaths of numerous senior Hamas officials and commanders, the killing of large numbers of civilians, mass displacement, and the loss of part of the organization’s military and leadership capabilities—have raised major questions about the costs and benefits of this strategy.
2. Iran and the Strategy of Regional Influence
To understand Iran’s role, it is necessary to distinguish between Tehran’s long-term support for Hamas and the question of whether Iran directly ordered the October 7 attack or not.
Based on various pieces of evidence, it can be argued that Iran played an important role in supporting Hamas’s attack against Israeli areas on October 7. In this context, a Reuters report published on September 4, 2024, referred to statements by U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland. According to the U.S. Justice Department’s allegations, the defendants received weapons as well as political and financial support from the Iranian government, along with support from Hezbollah.
For years, Iran has provided financial, military, and technical support to several armed groups in the region. Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and several groups in Iraq can each be viewed, at different levels and in different ways, within the framework of Iran’s regional network of alliances.
For Iran, these networks serve as instruments for expanding political and military influence and putting pressure on Israel and the United States, without necessarily having to enter into direct war itself.
At the same time, however, this strategy raises important questions about the independence of these groups’ decision-making, the human and political costs of regional conflicts, and their impact on regional security.
3. The Abraham Accords and the New Regional Equation
One of the important developments before October 7 was the expansion of diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and several Arab states. The Abraham Accords in 2020 normalized Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and opened the door to new cooperation in the fields of economics, technology, and security. Before the attack, discussions were also underway regarding the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
From a strategic perspective, closer relations between Israel and several Arab states could alter the regional balance of power and create new opportunities for economic and security cooperation. Such a process could also limit Iran’s influence and its ability to exert pressure on certain states. For this reason, Iran sought to increase instability in the region with the aim of disrupting this process.
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report published on August 27, 2024, discussed possible U.S.-Saudi agreements that could encourage Saudi-Israeli normalization while strengthening relations between Washington and Riyadh. The report also examined the possibility that Iran could view such normalization and stronger U.S.-Saudi security commitments negatively and seek to undermine them. (Every CRS Report)
Therefore, the impact of the October 7 attack on the process of normalizing relations between Israel and Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, has become an important issue in strategic analyses of the region.
4. Hamas’s Strategic Mistakes and the Losses in Gaza
The consequences of the Gaza war cannot be measured only by the number of deaths or the scale of destruction to buildings. The war, as a result of what can be described as Hamas’s strategic miscalculation, has caused enormous human and material losses to the population of Gaza and has significantly damaged the region’s infrastructure.
At the same time, Hamas’s military and leadership capabilities, as well as the organization’s authority in Gaza, have been substantially weakened. This situation has raised important questions about the future governance of Gaza, Hamas’s position within Palestinian politics, and the future course of a solution to the Palestinian question.
In assessing any strategy, it is necessary to consider not only its stated objectives but also its practical consequences for people’s lives, regional security, and the political future of the population. From this perspective, the human and national costs of the Gaza war require deep and responsible evaluation.
5. From Gaza to Lebanon: Changes in the Regional Balance of Power
One of the important consequences of October 7 was that the conflict did not remain confined to Gaza. Military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah intensified along the Lebanese border, while Houthi attacks from Yemen affected commercial shipping routes in the Red Sea.
For Hamas, the consequences of the war resulted in the loss of several senior leaders and commanders and damage to the organization’s military capabilities. Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, was killed in Tehran in July 2024. His killing, which occurred while he was in Iran, raised further questions about the security of the leaders of Iran-aligned groups and the ability to protect them.
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, was also killed in an Israeli attack in Beirut in September 2024.
These events raised an important question about the security of the leaders of Iran-aligned groups: If external political and military support can increase the offensive capabilities of such groups, can it also protect their security and political future?
The experience of the years following October 7 does not provide a simple answer to this question. However, it has demonstrated that the strategic costs of regional confrontation can be extremely high—not only for armed groups, but also for civilians and states across the region.
6. Did Hamas Serve the Palestinian Cause?
The experience of October 7 should lead to a reassessment of a fundamental question: Can armed organizations that receive support from Iran and other states effectively serve the national and political objectives of the Palestinian people, or can their policies and strategies result in greater suffering for those people in the context of a regional confrontation?
The Palestinian cause requires a political and just solution that places the rights, security, and future of the Palestinian people at its center. Any assessment of the strategies of armed groups should also consider their consequences for civilians, the ability to achieve national rights, and the prospects for reaching a political solution.
At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the stated objectives of any organization and the practical consequences of its policies. Only in this way can it be responsibly assessed to what extent such policies serve the Palestinian cause and the security of its people.
7. The Future of the Middle East: Toward Peace or a New Crisis?
October 7 was not merely a military event; it was a turning point that brought several longstanding regional questions back to the forefront. These include threats to Israel’s security, Iran’s role in regional conflicts, obstacles to peace and the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states, the limits of armed groups’ influence, and the ability of regional states to establish lasting agreements.
The future of the region will not be determined by a single event or a single power. Rather, it will depend on a combination of political, security, economic, and social factors. Addressing fundamental disputes, protecting the rights of civilians, reducing violence, and establishing effective mechanisms for dialogue and regional cooperation are among the factors that could alter the region’s future trajectory.
The future of the Middle East will be determined by whether the leaders and states of the region learn lessons from this tragedy or once again repeat the same cycle of attacks, retaliation, destruction, and revenge.
The central question is: Can the Middle East break out of the cycle of conflict and destruction and find a path toward lasting peace, or will it continue to be an arena of confrontation between regional and international powers?
The answer to this question will determine not only the future of Israel and Palestine, but also the stability and security of the entire Middle East.
by Arif Bawecani
Sources
Reuters, September 4, 2024, 4:06 AM GMT+2, updated September 4, 2024.
Congressional Research Service, Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel: Considerations for Congress, R48162, updated August 27, 2024. (Every CRS Report)
