The Return of the Sacre
Abstract
The essay analyzes the transformation of the interpretive categories through which the West reads 21st century conflicts, arguing that the demise of the great twentieth-century ideologies has not produced a reduction in the need for meaning, but its reconfiguration into more resilient forms of identity, religion and symbolism. In this framework, religion is understood not as a cultural residue but as the narrative infrastructure of the political, capable of structuring legitimacy, belonging and the perception of conflict.
The text highlights how Western politics often continues to operate through analytical tools centered on the rationality of interests, while a significant part of contemporary dynamics is driven by identity-based and non-negotiable forms of political logic that tend to resist negotiation. The result is a growing asymmetry between interpretive tools and geopolitical reality. Through the case of the Middle East and with particular reference to regional and global dynamics, the essay shows how international competition is played out not only on the material plane, but also on that of narratives and systems of meaning. Finally, the increasing role of the time factor and internal political uncertainty of major powers as structural variables of the emerging multipolar order is emphasized.
Text
I. Introduction: the problem of interpretive categories
The great ideologies of the twentieth century have waned, but the human need for belonging, meaning and legitimacy has not disappeared with them. Where the void left by universal narratives has not been filled by solid institutions, new forms of strong collective identity – religious, cultural, and symbolic– have returned to occupy center stage. And therein lies one of the most obvious limitations of contemporary Western politics: continuing to interpret as mere conflicts of interest political dynamics that, in many regions of the world, are experienced as conflicts of identity and destiny.[1]
Two recent reflections on the Middle East and the relationship between faith, pluralism and fundamentalism highlight a structural tension between peace, stability and dogmatism. Both move from assumptions that are difficult to dispute: peace requires stability, fundamentalism hardens conflicts, and pluralism is a condition of coexistence. However, these principles, while valid, do not exhaust the historical terrain on which they apply.
The difficulty of Western politics lies not in the choice of values, but in having attributed to these values an almost automatic capacity to transform reality.
II. The illusion of irreversible secularization
For a long time, Western modernity assumed that economic development, education and democratic institutions would gradually reduce the role of religion in public life.
Secularization was interpreted as a universal destiny rather than a historically situated trajectory.
Twentieth-century ideologies occupied the space of meaning with quasi-religious structures: orthodoxies, heresies, salvific promises. Their crisis did not eliminate the underlying need, but liberated the space.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union were read as the beginning of a rational and stabilized global order [2].
This was one of the great postwar illusions: the conflict did not disappear, but changed the grammar through which it was interpreted.
Nevertheless, such a trajectory does not exclude the persistence of partial secularization processes operating in many societies, making the overall picture less linear than often assumed.
III. The return of strong forms of collective belonging
In the post-ideological vacuum, religious, national and ethnic identities have re-emerged not as residues of the past, but as active devices of meaning production.
Religion has regained a systemic function: providing identity, legitimacy and moral horizon.
In many contexts it represents not a secondary cultural variable, but a primary infrastructure of the political.
IV. The limit of Western strategic rationality
Western political theory interprets conflict through categories of interest: deterrence, incentives, costs and benefits [3].
These tools assume rational actors oriented toward utility maximization.
The problem emerges when this schema is applied to systems in which identity precedes, or otherwise deeply conditions, interest.
An interest can be negotiated; an identity tends to be much less flexible.
However, even highly structured identities may themselves be strategically reinterpreted when material constraints and political opportunities evolve.
V. Religion as political infrastructure
In many contemporary realities, religion operates as the narrative infrastructure of the political: it structures the perception of reality and defines the legitimate and the illegitimate.
When legitimacy takes on a transcendent dimension, political conflict tends to turn into absolute conflict.
In systems where power and religious legitimacy are intertwined, repression of dissent can be reinterpreted as defense of the moral order, reinforcing internal cohesion through dynamics of external polarization.
VI. Narratives and Political System Resilience
The survival of political systems depends not only on coercion, but also on the ability to transform conflict into narrative confirmation.
Neutralization of leadership does not necessarily imply neutralization of the idea.
In some circumstances, external pressure can help strengthen internal cohesion through mechanisms of symbolic reinterpretation of the conflict.
However, this does not exclude the possibility that, in other contexts, external pressure may produce opposite effects, generating fragmentation or pragmatic adaptation rather than identity hardening
VII. The Iranian Case and External Geopolitical Architecture
The Iranian case allows a particularly clear observation of the overlap between internal dynamics and external architectures of geopolitical competition.
The resilience of a political system depends not only on its domestic stability, but also on its position within networks of strategic interdependence that can sustain, contain, or redefine its function.
From this perspective, the relationship between the Russian Federation and Iran does not appear to be fully interpretable either from an ideological perspective or as a mere contingent alliance. Rather, it can be read as a functional relationship within a broader Eurasian architecture.
For Moscow, Iran represents a relevant node along the axis that connects the post-Soviet space to the Middle East, all the way to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean [4].
This configuration fits into a logic of strategic pressure distribution, which tends to complicate the U.S. concentration of resources and attention on individual theaters.
However, this relationship remains inherently ambivalent. Russia and Iran share some tactical convergences, but diverge on structural elements: the management of regional influence, relations with third-party actors such as Turkey, and the degree to which they accept a truly symmetrical multipolar order.
The result is an asymmetric and selective form of cooperation, in which each actor tends to use the other as temporary leverage within a broader strategy of global positioning.
However, this interpretation does not exclude the possibility that the Russia–Iran relationship may evolve into more institutionalized forms or, conversely, regress depending on the evolution of major conflicts, particularly in Eurasian and Middle Eastern theaters.
VIII. Time and competition between powers
Geopolitical competitions are also played out in the time dimension.
Great Powers may experience strategic erosion not only because of direct adversaries, but also because of the duration and overlapping of strategic engagements [5].
Time becomes an asymmetric geopolitical resource: some systems turn it into resilience, others into structural vulnerability.
IX. The U.S. Electoral Factor
U.S. foreign policy appears increasingly influenced by domestic dynamics.
The growing perception of strategic discontinuity is not only a political effect, but becomes itself a geopolitical factor.
More than the sign of individual administrations, the overall predictability of the political system matters [6].
X. The 21st century as a competition between systems of meaning
Contemporary conflict is less and less exclusively about territories and resources, and more and more about the production of meaning.
Societies that lose the ability to generate shared narratives are not necessarily defeated militarily, but may progressively weaken in terms of internal cohesion.
At the same time, such narratives may themselves be partly reinforced by material and institutional conditions, suggesting that symbolic and structural dimensions remain deeply intertwined.
CONCLUSION
The return of the sacred cannot be interpreted as a mere regression, but as a possible mode of re-emergence of the symbolic dimension in contemporary political systems.
The 21st century does not mark the end of narratives, but their multiplication and competition.
The main limitation of contemporary Western analysis lies not so much in having ignored religion as in having often placed it subordinate to interpretative models centered exclusively on instrumental rationality.
The result is a growing distance between analytical tools and observed reality: on the one hand systems that negotiate interests, on the other systems whose political behavior is shaped by highly symbolic forms of identity.
To the extent that this asymmetry persists the risk is not only that of prediction error, but that of a partial understanding of reality.
However, an alternative reading – of a more materialist or institutionalist kind – could argue that even the most structured identities nevertheless remain constrained, at least ultimately, by economic, technological and power factors, suggesting that between strategic rationality and the symbolic dimension there is not a clear separation, but a continuous hybridization.
And it is in this unresolved tension that much of the complexity of the contemporary international system lies.
FINAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPENDIX
In the final analysis, the interpretive framework proposed in this essay is situated within a wider plurality of possible readings of the contemporary international system, which can be succinctly traced to three theoretical families that are not necessarily exclusive.
A first reading, of the identity-constructivist type, emphasizes the role of narratives, affiliations and the symbolic infrastructure of the political. From this perspective, conflicts tend to be understood as processes of defining and defending collective identities, in which the religious and cultural dimensions assume a primary ordering function.
A second, materialist-realist reading, on the other hand, tends to relate the observed dynamics back to power structures, capacity distribution and strategic competition among states. In this scheme, identities are often seen as derivative tools or functional languages for the legitimization of deeper and more permanent interests.
A third, institutionalist reading emphasizes the role of regulatory, economic and multilateral architectures in modulating actors’ behavior, suggesting that even the most intense forms of conflict are partially contained, mediated or transformed by institutional constraints and systemic interdependencies.
The analytical value of one perspective does not necessarily lie in its ability to exclude others, but rather in its ability to clarify which dimensions of reality it succeeds in making more intelligible and which it tends to leave in the shadows.
APPLIED APPENDIX
Strategic Windows and Constraints: India as a Stress Test of the Proposed Interpretive Framework
The interpretive framework developed in this essay suggests that contemporary international competition cannot be reduced to the distribution of material capabilities alone. Political systems operate simultaneously through interests, narratives, identities and temporal structures.
To test the heuristic utility of this framework, the Indian case offers a particularly significant example. India occupies a distinctive position within the emerging multipolar environment because it combines democratic institutions, civilizational identity, economic growth and strategic autonomy.
Rather than attempting to predict specific political outcomes, the purpose of this exercise is to identify possible strategic windows and constraints generated by the interaction of symbolic, material and temporal variables.
I. Window of Opportunity: India as an Intermediary Between Systems of Meaning
Within the framework proposed in this essay, contemporary international competition increasingly involves the coexistence of partially incompatible systems of meaning.
India possesses a relatively unusual configuration: it combines democratic institutions with strong cultural and civilizational narratives while remaining deeply integrated into global economic networks.
This combination may allow India to function as an intermediary actor between different political and symbolic frameworks.
Potential implications include:
- increased diplomatic flexibility;
- broader coalition-building capacity;
- enhanced legitimacy across different geopolitical environments.
II. Window of Opportunity: Strategic Autonomy Under Multipolarity
The progressive fragmentation of international order may increase opportunities for actors capable of avoiding rigid bloc alignment.
India has historically pursued forms of strategic autonomy through selective engagement with multiple partners.
This may permit:
- simultaneous relations with Western powers and non-Western actors;
- reduced dependence on singular strategic architectures;
- greater adaptability under changing international conditions.
However, such flexibility may become increasingly difficult to maintain under conditions of intensified systemic competition.
III. Window of Opportunity: Internal Cohesion Through Narrative Production
The model developed in this essay emphasizes that political resilience depends not only on institutions and material resources, but also on the production of shared systems of meaning.
India increasingly demonstrates the construction of narratives linking historical continuity, cultural identity and political legitimacy.
Such narratives may strengthen:
- internal cohesion;
- political legitimacy;
- long-term strategic continuity.
IV. Constraining Window: Reduction of Complete Strategic Neutrality
As international competition expands into technological infrastructures, supply chains and strategic networks, the space for complete neutrality may progressively narrow.
India may therefore encounter increasing pressure to define more explicit alignments regarding:
- technological standards;
- security partnerships;
- economic integration mechanisms.
V. Temporal Window: Demography as a Strategic Resource
Within the proposed framework, time constitutes a strategic variable rather than merely a chronological condition.
India’s demographic profile may represent a major geopolitical advantage.
However, demographic potential remains conditional upon:
- employment generation;
- educational capacity;
- technological development;
- institutional adaptation.
Consequently, demographic growth may function either as strategic leverage or as a source of structural tension.
VI. Identity as Both Resource and Constraint
Strong identity systems may reinforce resilience and social cohesion.
At the same time, identity structures may also generate risks of rigidity and reduced adaptability.
India therefore illustrates a broader tension identified throughout this essay:
the same symbolic structures capable of generating cohesion may also impose limits upon strategic flexibility.
Concluding Observation
The Indian case does not confirm or invalidate the interpretive model proposed in this essay.
Rather, it illustrates how contemporary geopolitical behavior may emerge from the interaction of material interests, temporal structures and systems of meaning.
From this perspective, India appears less as a conventional regional power and more as a possible intermediary actor within an increasingly plural and multipolar international environment.
Bibliography
[1] Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.
[2] Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
[3] Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
[4] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
[5] Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.
[6] Kissinger, Henry. World Order. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.
Texts for Further Study
Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.
(Religion as a social structure of meaning-making).
Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor Books, 1966.
(Theoretical foundation of reality as an intersubjective construction).
Berman, Sheri. Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
(Relationship between ideologies, the state and political consolidation).
Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1995.
(Religion as a total social fact and matrix of collective cohesion).
Gray, John. Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia. London: Allen Lane, 2007.
(Critique of modern ideologies as secularized religions).
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
(Centrality of cultural identities in global conflict).
Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
(Historical evolution of political Islam).
Kepel, Gilles. The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.
(Return of religion as a political and social force).
Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
(Historical tension between Western modernity and the Islamic world).
Mackinder, Halford J. Democratic Ideals and Reality. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.
(Foundations of classical geopolitics and Heartland theory).
Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
(Narrative structure of time and construction of political meaning).
Roy, Olivier. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
(Crisis and transformation of contemporary political Islam).
Scott, James C. The Art of Not Being Governed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
(Logics of resistance to the state and peripheral autonomy).
Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
(Relationship between sovereignty, legitimacy and theological structures).
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
(Critique of the linear narrative of secularization).
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
(Balancing logics and threat perception).
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
(Constructivism in international relations: identities and interests as social constructions).
Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.
(Multipolarity and transformation of global order).
Khanna, Parag. The Future is Asian. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019.
(Asian geopolitical reconfiguration and emerging power structures).
Mahbubani, Kishore. Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy. New York: PublicAffairs, 2020.
(Strategic competition and systemic transition).
Haas, Richard. The World: A Brief Introduction. New York: Penguin Press, 2020.
(Contemporary international system and emerging global challenges).
Braudel, Fernand. On History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
(Long-term historical structures and temporal analysis).
Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934–1961.
(Civilizational development and historical cycles).
Kaviraj, Sudipta. The Imaginary Institution of India. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
(Indian identity and political modernity).
