The Taiwan Equation: Beijing, Taipei, the White House and Congres
The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Washington was primarily intended to stabilize a Sino-American relationship that had become dangerously unpredictable. The outcome remained limited: no major agreement on Taiwan, an extended trade truce, and a declared willingness to maintain channels of dialogue. But behind this relative détente lies another balance of power: the one developing in Washington itself around Taiwan.
For several months, a significant portion of security assistance destined for the island has been delayed. More than $15 billion in aid and weaponry are involved. Beijing wants U.S. sales to be slowed or halted. Before the summit, Xi was expected to pressure Trump to limit arms sales to Taiwan. Yet no major American concession on this point was announced. The problem is that the absence of an agreement does not mean there is no effect.
For Beijing, the delay itself can have strategic value. Every month a delivery is postponed is a month during which Taipei lacks certain planned capabilities. Every American hesitation also raises a broader question: Does the United States consider military aid to Taiwan a relatively independent strategic commitment, or an element it can use in Sino-American negotiations?
This is where Congress comes into play. Republican Senator Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, reminded this week that the United States must honor its commitments to Taiwan. Several Republican lawmakers had already called on Trump to unlock more than $15 billion in security aid. Democratic senators have also applied similar pressure after the Trump–Xi summit.
This convergence is significant. It shows that U.S. policy toward Taiwan does not boil down to the personal relationship between Trump and Xi. The president may want to keep certain decisions as bargaining chips. Congress, on the other hand, may consider that prolonging delays risks reducing the credibility of American commitments.
Here we see a new dimension of the Washington paradox. The United States wants to avoid a direct confrontation with China. It also wants Taiwan to be more capable of ensuring its own defense. But if Washington slows down the very means for Taipei to strengthen that defense in order to preserve dialogue with Beijing, it may have the opposite effect: Taiwan becomes more anxious about the U.S. guarantee and thus seeks to develop greater autonomous capabilities.
This is already visible. Taiwan has just transferred a senior navy official to the coast guard to improve coordination between the two forces. Taipei is gradually developing what may function as a “second navy.” The Anping-class coast guard ships are derived from fast military vessels and some can be equipped with missiles. The navy and the coast guard have already participated together in anti-blockade exercises.
This movement is a direct response to the so-called Chinese gray zone strategy. Beijing does not need to invade Taiwan to gradually shift the balance of power. Chinese coast guard, naval patrols, and military exercises can increase China’s presence around the island without immediately crossing the threshold into open war.
For Taipei, the dilemma is simple. Responding systematically with the navy could turn every incident into a military confrontation. Not responding could, on the contrary, allow Beijing to gradually normalize its presence. Taiwan is therefore seeking an intermediate solution: responding below the threshold of war while preparing its forces to quickly shift to a military configuration in the event of a crisis.
This evolution also changes the relationship with Washington. The more Taiwan develops its drones, coastal missiles, coast guard vessels that can be quickly armed, and asymmetric capabilities, the harder it becomes to impose a blockade or a low-cost military operation. This is precisely what Washington has been asking for several years: greater defensive autonomy.
But this autonomy comes with a consequence. The more Taiwan becomes capable of defending itself alone during the initial phases of a crisis, the more Taipei also possesses its own capacity for strategic assessment. The island remains heavily dependent on American support, but it can no longer build its entire defense on the assumption of an immediate decision from Washington.
Washington wants a Taiwan strong enough not to be totally dependent on American forces, but sufficiently tied to the U.S. so that American strategy remains decisive. Beijing, for its part, wants to prevent any move toward formal independence. Yet its ongoing military and maritime pressure precisely encourages Taipei to strengthen the very capabilities that make Chinese coercion more difficult.
And now the U.S. Congress adds a third level of constraint. Trump may seek a more stable relationship with Xi. Beijing may hope that this stability will slow some decisions regarding Taiwan. But Congress can intervene to turn military support for Taipei into an institutional commitment that does not depend solely on presidential choices.
The question becomes broader: who really decides American policy toward Taiwan? The president, who negotiates directly with Xi? Congress, which votes the budgets and can require that commitments be implemented? The Pentagon, which reasons according to deterrence needs? Or Taiwan itself, which is gradually adapting its strategy to Chinese pressure and American uncertainty?
Perhaps this is where the real change lies after the Trump–Xi summit. The Sino-American relationship may become more stable at the top, without the Taiwan issue stabilizing. On the contrary, the more Washington and Beijing seek to manage their rivalry, the more Taipei may wonder whether this stability could one day be sought at its expense.
Détente between two great powers is therefore not necessarily reassuring for their partners. It can create another form of uncertainty: what could become negotiable in the name of this stability?
Taiwan thus finds itself at the center of a more complex strategic triangle. Beijing applies gradual pressure. The White House seeks to manage rivalry with China. And part of Congress wants to prevent support for Taiwan from being used as a bargaining chip in this relationship.
We are thus no longer facing just a China–Taiwan standoff protected by the United States. We now have a four-actor equation: Beijing, Taipei, the White House, and the U.S. Congress.
And the final question is: does Trump–Xi détente really reduce the risk around Taiwan, or does it simply shift part of the balance of power from the South China Sea to the very heart of the American political system?
