Washington–Myanmar: When Strategic Interests Challenge the Credibility of Sanction
Can the United States negotiate with a government it condemns without weakening its own principles?
In geopolitics, governments do not always act in accordance with the ideas they espouse. This does not necessarily imply that they are forsaking their principles. Sometimes they’re only trying to strike a balance between their principles and their strategic objectives. The recent talks between Washington and Myanmar’s military-backed government are a good example of this dilemma.
On October 16, Reuters reported that American officials had met representatives of Myanmar’s authorities in Tokyo. It was their second meeting in a month. Earlier discussions had focused on the release of an American businessman and the fight against cybercrime targeting American citizens. But another American interest may be emerging: Myanmar’s large deposits of rare earth minerals, which are important for electric vehicles, advanced technologies and military equipment. The exact subjects discussed in Tokyo have not been confirmed. Nevertheless, these meetings raise an important question: is Washington simply being practical, or is its competition with China beginning to influence the principles behind American sanctions?
There are several ways to understand what may be happening.
1. Can Washington negotiate without recognising the regime?
The first possibility is that Washington believes it can talk to Myanmar’s authorities without giving them political legitimacy. After all, discussing pragmatic matters with a government does not imply endorsing its ideas. Negotiations between nations and governments they vehemently disagree with are common. While retaining sanctions against Myanmar’s military elites, especially Min Aung Hlaing, Washington may be able to ensure the return of American citizens, combat cybercrime, and maintain some influence. Sometimes a nation’s influence can be diminished by rejecting all communication without altering the actions of the government it wishes to exert pressure on.
But there is another side to the argument. For a government facing international isolation, even a diplomatic meeting can be considered a political success. Myanmar’s military authorities could present renewed American contacts as a sign that their international isolation is slowly ending. This could happen even without formal recognition or the removal of sanctions. The real question is therefore not whether Washington should negotiate, but what it expects to receive in return. Diplomacy can help defend national interests without abandoning principles. But it can also strengthen the very government those principles are supposed to challenge.
2. Is China the real reason behind these talks?
A second possibility is that Washington sees Myanmar as part of its wider competition with Beijing. Myanmar has important deposits of heavy rare earth minerals. China, meanwhile, controls a large part of the industrial processing needed to turn these minerals into products used in modern technologies. For the United States, reducing dependence on China has become both an economic and a national security priority. At first sight, Myanmar could offer Washington an interesting opportunity.
But the situation is far more complicated. First, having access to minerals does not mean controlling their production. Mining is only the beginning. Refining, processing, technology and transport are equally important. Second, many mining areas in Myanmar are controlled by armed ethnic groups fighting the military government. An agreement with the authorities in Naypyidaw would not automatically give American companies access to those resources. Third, China already enjoys major advantages in the region. Its geographical position, trade relationships and industrial experience cannot easily be replaced. Washington could therefore discover that talking to Myanmar’s government is much easier than gaining real access to its minerals.
There is, however, another possibility. Perhaps the United States is not trying to replace China immediately. Perhaps it simply wants to keep its options open for the future. In geopolitics, maintaining a possibility can sometimes be just as important as acting on it.
3. Are American sanctions becoming more selective?
This is perhaps the most interesting question. Sanctions are not simply economic measures. They are also a way for countries to express political principles and influence the behaviour of others. When Washington sanctions a government, it sends a message: certain actions have consequences. Myanmar’s military leadership remains under American sanctions because of serious human rights abuses and the military takeover in 2021.
But sanctions are also political decisions. Choosing whom to sanction, how strongly and for how long is never completely separate from national interests. These choices can reflect political priorities, different interpretations of events and, sometimes, selective judgments. That does not mean sanctions are necessarily unjustified. But it does mean they should not automatically be considered neutral or applied equally in every situation.
Myanmar may now provide an interesting example. If Washington begins to increase cooperation with the military authorities mainly because it wants access to rare earth minerals, critics could argue that strategic interests are becoming more important than the values America claims to defend. But the opposite argument also deserves consideration. Sanctions are foreign policy instruments. Their goal is to promote behavioral changes rather than to permanently obstruct communication. Reopening communication might be a sensible choice if talks can provide outcomes that isolation cannot. Therefore, whether Washington is altering its diplomatic strategy is not the true question. It is whether Washington is gradually altering its beliefs to serve new strategic interests, or if it is altering its techniques while maintaining the same values. The two differ significantly from one another. And the legitimacy of US foreign policy depends on this distinction.
4. What does Myanmar hope to gain?
We often analyse international relations through the competition between great powers. Smaller countries are presented as territories where Washington, Beijing or Moscow compete for influence. But these countries also have their own interests and strategies.
Myanmar’s military authorities may see renewed American contacts as an opportunity. They might use these negotiations to minimize their diplomatic isolation, develop contacts with other countries, and potentially boost their bargaining position with China. Beijing is still an important economic partner for Myanmar.But being influential does not mean controlling every political decision. The simple possibility of closer relations with Washington could give Myanmar’s authorities more room to negotiate with Beijing. Japan’s role is also worth noting. Tokyo hosted the latest discussions and has maintained a more complex relationship with Myanmar than many Western countries.
However, Myanmar faces a major problem. The country is deeply divided by civil war. The military authorities do not control all its territory, and several armed groups control areas that are important for natural resources and trade. This limits the government’s ability to make agreements that can actually be implemented. Myanmar may therefore try to benefit from American interest without being able to offer Washington what it wants. And Washington may discover that the government it is talking to does not control some of the resources it hopes to obtain. This could become the main contradiction of the entire initiative.
Three possible scenarios
The first scenario is limited cooperation. Washington continues talking to Myanmar mainly about American citizens, cybercrime and security issues. Sanctions remain largely unchanged, and both sides obtain some practical benefits without making major political concessions.
The second scenario is a gradual improvement in relations. Discussions begin to include rare earth minerals, trade and possibly broader economic cooperation. Washington could gain some influence, but Myanmar’s military authorities might also gain greater international acceptance without making meaningful political reforms.
The third scenario is disappointment for Washington. The United States discovers that Myanmar’s civil war, China’s strong economic position and existing sanctions make real cooperation very difficult. In that case, Washington may obtain few strategic benefits, while Myanmar’s military authorities still gain something from the political importance of the meetings.
None of these situations are guaranteed. A lot will rely on what Washington truly desires, what Myanmar can provide, and whether or not American officials establish explicit guidelines for future collaboration.
Conclusion: Contradiction or pragmatism?
The issue raised by the Myanmar case extends well beyond Southeast Asia. Access to supply chains, technology, and natural resources is becoming more crucial as big nations compete more fiercely. This could force nations to engage in negotiations with states whose actions they formally denounce. Does that imply,that they are giving up on their values? Not all the time.
Values have never been the exclusive foundation of foreign policy. The balance of power, security, and interests are also involved. There may be valid grounds for Washington to resume communication with Myanmar. It might also have valid reasons to keep its military leaders under sanctions.
Explaining how these two policies can cooperate is the difficult part.
The United States’ strategy might be viewed as practical diplomacy if it produces significant results while continuing to pressure for political change. However, If Washington gets nothing in return and Myanmar’s military leaders are acknowledged internationally, the equation would seem very different. Furthermore, the question is far broader. What happens to the legitimacy of the values that sanctions are meant to uphold if strategic interests increasingly dictate when they are imposed, upheld, or loosened?
the question is not whether a powerful nation should engage with a government that it opposes. It concerns whether that powerful nation can protect its interests without undermining the principles it professes to uphold. Talking to an enemy does not negate the fundamentals of diplomacy. When its decisions are only motivated by strategic interests, it runs the risk of losing them.
Vérification factuelle : Reuters, 16 octobre 2026 ; Stimson Center, 20 juillet 2026 ; U.S. Trade Representative, avis sur les minerais critiques birmans.
